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I.  INTRODUCTION
Up until the 1970s, indeterminate sentencing dominated sentencing in 
the United States.1 This model implied a focus on offender rehabilitation, 
with the concomitant need for individualized treatment.2 The American 
Law Institute’s (ALI) Model Penal Code (MPC), published in 1962, 
incorporated these assumptions, though in contrast to its General Part, the 
MPC’s sentencing provisions failed to attract adherents during the 
substantial revisions of state and federal sentencing laws, which started in 
the mid-1970s.3 As rehabilitation has fallen into disrepute and prison 
populations have skyrocketed,4 other sentencing goals have taken center 
                                                                                                                     
 * Dean and Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A., Bates College; J.D., 
Yale Law School; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful for the excellent 
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 1. Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895–97 (1990). 
 2. Id.
 3. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxviii 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 4. Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and Population 
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stage. The federal sentencing system, with its ill-regarded guideline 
regime, appears largely built on retribution and incapacitation,5 which, 
together with the politicization of crime, have contributed to a dramatic 
build-up in the federal prison population. Most states have also witnessed a 
substantial increase in their prison populations6 while struggling to control 
the resulting expenditures and overcrowding. Between the state and federal 
prison populations, the United States has an unprecedentedly large prison 
system, maintaining the highest number of prisoners in the world.7
The current approaches to sentencing and corrections are based on four 
different models: indeterminate sentencing, comprehensive structured 
sentencing, community/restorative justice, and comprehensive risk-based 
systems.8 Any systemic classification should not only include the 
sentencing process—including the existence of guideline regimes and 
mandatory minimums—but also the back-end process, such as the scope of 
good time and parole release.9 In many state sentencing systems, much 
back-end discretion continues to be exercised through corrections 
administrators.10
One of the ways in which prison administrators exercise discretion is 
through the award of “good conduct time,” or “good time.”11 The 
                                                                                                                     
Trends, in 26 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH—PRISONS 63, 73–76 (Michael Tonry & 
Joan Petersilia eds., 1999). 
 5. Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using 
the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 23–24 (2003) 
(stating that use of “rational reconstruction” indicates a “modified just desert” philosophy of 
punishment, which blends punishment proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and 
incapacitation, dominates the federal sentencing guidelines). But see Aaron J. Rappaport, 
Unprincipled Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Troubling Silence About the 
Purposes of Punishment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1043–46 (2003) (asking that the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission develop a coherent sentencing philosophy).  
6. See generally HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2007, at 1 (2008) (analyzing data from the National 
Prisoner Statistics program for state and federal prison populations from 2006 to 2007), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p.07.pdf. For more dramatic comparisons of 
incarceration growth over the last twenty-five years, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INCARCERATION RATE, 1980–2007, chart at 1, available 
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/incrt.htm (last visited July 14, 2009). 
 7. THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PUBLIC SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, PUBLIC SAFETY,
PUBLIC SPENDING: FORECASTING AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 2007–2011, at 1 (2007), available 
at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/State-based_policy/PSPP_ 
prison_projections_0207.pdf. 
 8. MICHAEL TONRY, THE FRAGMENTATION OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA 3 
(1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/175721.pdf. 
 9. MICHAEL TONRY, RECONSIDERING INDETERMINATE AND STRUCTURED SENTENCING 2 
(1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/175722.pdf. 
 10. Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion and Accountability Within Sentencing Structures, 
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 679, 681–82 (1993). 
 11. Id. at 682. 
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availability of such time varies widely between sentencing systems.12 In the 
course of different drafts, the ALI’s proposed Model Penal Code: 
Sentencing has also suggested a widely varying percentage discount for 
good conduct and program participation. While increased good time carries 
the risk of administrative discretion, it is of crucial importance in a regime 
in which long sentences appear to continue unabated because good time 
will assure appropriate prison conduct and guarantee a limited form of 
relief and hope to inmates. Equally important, the enhanced focus on 
community re-entry upon release mandates that rehabilitation begin upon 
entry into the prison system.13 Program participation, including drug abuse 
and educational programs, and the adoption of work-related values through 
participation in correctional employment suggest the appropriateness of a 
reward in the form of decreased sentence length. Undoubtedly, good time 
could and should be re-thought if the length of United States prison 
sentences and the rate of imprisonment were to fall. 
This Article explains the changing assumptions behind sentencing since 
the initial issuance of the MPC, the purposes of good time in sentencing 
and post-sentencing, and addresses good time in light of existing 
sentencing regimes at federal and state levels. As well, this Article 
discusses the Model Penal Code: Sentencing’s approach to good time and 
proposes the adoption of a more extensive and differently structured good 
time regime than currently proposed in the ALI’s Sentencing Draft. 
II.  HOW ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SENTENCING HAVE CHANGED:
FROM THE MPC TO THE MPC: SENTENCING
Drafted in the 1950s and ultimately adopted in 1962, the MPC
subscribed to indeterminate sentencing, with its focus on rehabilitation and 
individualization of treatment.14 The MPC’s eight purposes of sentencing 
included “the correction and rehabilitation of offenders.”15 Rehabilitative 
goals assured at least the promise of enhanced governmental funding of 
programs that allowed offenders to improve and advance themselves.16 The 
MPC’s sentencing provisions and back-end measures, including parole and 
good time, reflected its focus on rehabilitative efforts and offenders’ 
perceived treatment needs. Good time was suggested at six days per month 
for “good behavior and faithful performance of duties,” with another six 
                                                                                                                     
 12. Id. at 685–86. 
13. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Note 25–26 (Tentative Draft No. 
1, 2007); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 25–26 (Discussion Draft, 2006). 
 14. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: PART I, §§ 6.01 to 7.09, at 2–3 (1985); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxviii-xxix (Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 15. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 1.02(2)(b) (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985); see also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2), at 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2007). 
 16. TONRY, supra note 9, at 5. 
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days to be awarded for “meritorious behavior or exceptional performance 
of his [or her] duties.”17 Most prisoners would have received 20% good 
time under the MPC’s original good time provision. The credits would 
have applied to the minimum term, advancing parole eligibility, and would 
have applied to the maximum term, advancing mandatory release.18
Subsequent sentencing reform has focused on shifting sentencing 
discretion from the back-end, where it rested with parole officials and 
prison administrators, to the front-end, where it rests with the judiciary.19
In addition, such reforms have focused on “truth in sentencing.”20 While 
“truth in sentencing” has multiple meanings, one of its usages emphasizes 
the “close correspondence between the pronounced sentence and time 
served,”21 which also leads to greater predictability for the inmate and the 
public. Admittedly, predictability can also be achieved while disparity 
between the sentence imposed and the time served occurs.22
The ALI’s Model Penal Code: Sentencing builds on these newer 
sentencing approaches. Its purposes “overlay[] limits of proportionality 
upon the pursuit of utilitarian goals.” It recommends the creation of 
permanent state sentencing commissions and provides for sufficient 
judicial discretion to individualize sentences.23 In its current version, the 
Model Penal Code: Sentencing limits good time to 15% to prevent 
increased back-end discretion.24
III.  “GOOD TIME” 
“Good time” reduces the actual time a defendant sentenced to prison 
serves—usually because he has complied with prison rules and 
regulations.25 Because good time may amount to a substantial sentence 
reduction, it is valuable to inmates.26 The value of good time is also 
reflected in the ex post facto protection against a decrease in good time 
through legislation enacted after the date of the offender’s sentencing.27
Another indication of its value includes the due process protections that 
accompany the loss of good time.28
                                                                                                                     
 17. MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.1 (1962). 
 18. TONRY, supra note 9, at 4. 
 19. Knapp, supra note 10, at 684.  
 20. Id.
 21. Id. at 685. 
22. Id.
 23. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxx-xxxi 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 24. Id.
 25. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1521 (8th ed. 2004). 
 26. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561 (1974) (“The deprivation of good time is 
unquestionably a matter of considerable importance.”). 
 27. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 25, 36 (1981). 
28. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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Good time has frequently been classified in four different ways. First 
and most traditionally, it can be awarded for good prison conduct, which 
usually implies mere compliance with prison rules and regulations and 
avoidance of disciplinary infractions. Frequently, correctional systems 
“assume [such] good time credit will automatically accrue to eligible 
inmates.”29 Therefore, it is often referred to as statutory good time.30
Second, there may be a separate award of good time for successful 
participation in prison programs.31 In this case “good time” is often 
referred to as “earned time.”32 Third, good time may be granted for 
extraordinary achievements or service, which may include participation in 
drug experiments, donation of blood, or saving a corrections official during 
a riot.33 Only occasionally do states provide for such meritorious good 
time.34  
Fourth and finally, some state prison systems have used good time 
largely as a population management tool, designed to alleviate the pressure 
emanating from overcrowding.35 In that case, “[e]mergency release credit 
is [] available . . . as a contingency to manage overcrowding.”36 Good 
conduct deductions are awarded to the inmate in such situations solely for 
“staying out of trouble.”37 In the early 1980s Michigan and Iowa both 
authorized early releases once their prison populations had reached a 
certain level. In some states, prisoners served increasingly less time 
because of a combination of generous good-time and emergency releases.38
In the early 1990s, using this approach, Texas released offenders after 
having served on average only 13% of the sentence imposed.39 During the 
same time, North Carolina offenders served less than 20% of their 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Dora Schriro, Is Good Time a Good Idea? A Practitioner’s Perspective, 21 FED. SENT’G 




 33. James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA L. REV. 217, 
221 (1982). 
 34. Schriro, supra note 29, at 179. 
 35. STATE OF CAL. LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS CRISIS:
TIME IS RUNNING OUT 25 (Jan. 25, 2007), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/185/Report18 
5.pdf [hereinafter SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS CRISIS]. 
 36. Schriro, supra note 29, at 179. 
 37. SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTIONS CRISIS, supra note 35, at 25. Other administrative 
ways to control prison overcrowding include work release and pre-release. Knapp, supra note 10, at 
682. 
 38. Judith Greene, Getting Tough on Crime: The History and Political Context of Sentencing 
Reform Developments Leading to the Passage of the 1994 Crime Act, in Sentencing and Society: 
International Perspectives 43, 51 (Cyrus Tata & Neil Hutton, eds., 1998). 
 39. Knapp, supra note 10, at 681 n.9; see also Carl Reynolds, Sentencing and Corrections: 
From Crowding to Equilibrium (and Back Again?), 69 TEX. B.J. 232, 233 (2006) (stating that in its 
pursuit of a (partial) solution to overcrowding, the State of Texas engaged in substantial prison 
building throughout the 1990s).  
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sentences.40 Not surprisingly, attendant headlines resulted in widespread 
public frustration with sentencing.41 As a consequence, many states 
dramatically curtailed the discretion of prison officials to award sentence 
reductions or to move prisoners early into less restrictive confinement for 
program participation or work.42  
Ideally, good conduct should connote rehabilitation on the part of the 
prisoner and at the same time improve safety in prisons as an incentive for 
lawful behavior. In addition, an increasing number of those focused on 
public safety view good time as a way to “match[] pre-release requirements 
to an individual inmate’s future propensity for crime.”43 The Preliminary 
Draft to the Model Penal Code: Sentencing indicates that all inmates 
should have access to good time, based on any of the first three 
categories.44
A.  Purposes of Good Time 
Key policy issues in determining the award of good time include the 
amount of good time, the types of offenders eligible for such deductions, 
and the requirements attached to good time.45
Good time may serve a host of purposes. First, good time can provide 
an incentive for participation in educational, work, drug, or other types of 
programs.46 Correction officials have stated that “prisons are safer, more 
orderly, and more productive when inmates participate in programs.”47
Programming may enhance rehabilitation. Successful participation in the 
federal government’s Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP), for 
example, reduces recidivism.48 Second, “productive work programs permit 
inmates . . . to begin to repay their debt to society.”49 Finally, good time 
can incentivize compliance with prison rules or perhaps even exemplary 
behavior. Such compliance makes it possible for the institution to function 
                                                                                                                     
 40. Knapp, supra note 10, at 681 n.9. 
 41. PIERCE O’DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA 
FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 70 (1977). 
 42. DEAN J. CHAMPION, MEASURING OFFENDER RISK: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SOURCEBOOK 58 
(1993).  
 43. Schriro, supra note 29, at 179. 
 44. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.1 (1962). 
 45. BERT USEEM ET AL., INST. FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH UNIV. OF N.M., SENTENCING MATTERS,
BUT DOES GOOD TIME MATTER MORE? 3 (1996). 
46. Id.
 47. Id.
48. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DRUG TREATMENT PROJECTS:
TRIAD DRUG TREATMENT EVALUATION PROJECT, available at http://www.bop.gov/news/research_ 
projects/published_reports/drug_treat/oretriad.jsp (last visited July 20, 2009) (demonstrating that 
RDAP participants’ recidivism rates were lower than those of comparable former inmates); NEIL P.
LANGAN & BERNADETTE M.M. PELISSIER, THE EFFECT OF DRUG TREATMENT ON INMATE 
MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL PRISONS 11 (2002). 
 49. USEEM ET AL., supra note 45, at 3. 
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more smoothly. For that reason, most states allow for good time, at least 
for most offenders. However, “[n]o one knows whether, or in what 
measure, a reduction in good time will produce greater disorder behind 
bars.”50 States without good time do not appear to experience more 
frequent prison riots than those with good time.51
Good time may be used selectively. It may, for example, be restricted to 
non-violent offenders. While such a rule may enhance public safety by 
keeping violent offenders in prison longer, it could also create less 
compliance with prison rules and a perception of unfairness and inequality. 
In addition, this type of binary distinction may be too blunt to achieve its 
purpose.52 Some argue that instead of using such a crude distinction, good 
time should be awarded based on custody level.53 In turn, improvements in 
confinement or in custody level, rather than a time deduction, may result 
from enhanced compliance.54
Good time may also decrease sentence severity, assuming judges and 
juries do not increase the sentence to account for the good time reduction.55
Finally, good time undermines the goals of “truth-in-sentencing,” as the 
sentence served will not be close to the sentence imposed.56 This may only 
be a minor problem if the amount of good time is relatively limited, but 
may be quite dramatic in day-for-day systems, especially if those systems 
also have a generous parole regime. 
In both federal and state systems, most inmates are awarded the entire 
available amount of good time. One may draw one of two conclusions: 
Either the good time system is effective in assuring compliance with prison 
rules, or good time is ineffective because prison policies are either too lax 
or insufficiently enforced.57 For practical reasons, in large prison systems, 
there is “an inexorable tendency for statutory and meritorious good time to 
be awarded automatically.”58 Some have suggested that good time should 
not be awarded for mere failure to run afoul of rules or solely for 
participation in work programs, but instead should assess actual 
rehabilitation. If such awards were to be based on rehabilitative progress, 
                                                                                                                     
50. Id. at 4. 
 51. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 259. 
 52. USEEM ET AL., supra note 45, at 4–5. 
53. Id. at 5–6. 
 54. Schriro, supra note 29, at 181 (describing Arizona’s program which uses “[e]ach inmate’s 
successful completion of individualized pre-release plans [as] the basis for earning improved 
conditions of confinement”). 
 55. USEEM ET AL., supra note 45, at 6. Cf. O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 41, at 56 (suggesting 
need for decreased sentence length when limiting good time to a one-time maximum ten percent 
sentence reduction); Jacobs, supra note 33, at 221. 
56. See USEEM ET AL., supra note 45, at 6. 
57. Id. at 7. At least for New Mexico’s prison system, correction officials claimed to strictly 
enforce good time policies and considered them “a key management tool.” Id. at 10. 
 58. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 225. 
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however, the assessment would require an effective measure of such 
progress, which appears virtually impossible. In addition, substantially 
more personnel would be needed for these assessments.59
Others argue for evidence-based rehabilitative programs which bring 
about necessary cognitive changes.60 While some such programs are 
available, they also need to target the appropriate offender.61 Despite 
increasing knowledge about appropriate programming, state and federal 
good time rules often operate on outdated assumptions or seem to be 
driven by political concerns. 
B.  Federal “Good Time” 
In the federal system “good time” is earned for “satisfactory behavior,” 
which is defined as “exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary 
regulations.”62 Good time is available to any prisoner sentenced to a non-
life term longer than one year.63 The prisoner may receive credit of up to 
fifty-four days, which is awarded at the end of each year of 
imprisonment.64 Good time available to prisoners sentenced after 1996 
depends on whether they have “earned, or [are] making satisfactory 
progress toward earning, a high school diploma or an equivalent degree.”65
If that is not the case, the statutorily available maximum good time per year 
served is capped at forty-two days.66  
                                                                                                                     
59. See USEEM ET AL., supra note 45, at 11–12. 
 60. While research on the success of prison treatment remains sparse, the literature supports 
the claim that carefully targeted programs will decrease recidivism. Further detailed studies and 
meta-analysis remain necessary. See Gerald G. Gaes et al., Adult Correctional Treatment, in 26 
CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH—PRISONS 361, 415 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia 
eds., 1999). 
61. See generally Schriro, supra note 29, at 180 (providing examples of various states’ 
policies). 
 62. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2006). 
63. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305:1 (1962). Inmates with a sentence of 365 days or 
less do not earn any good time. Id.
 64. Id. The military system also allows for good time credit, with a maximum good time 
allowance of 10 days per month. In addition, extra good time credit is available for work 
assignments, with a maximum of seven days per month. Jeff Walker, The Practical Consequences 
of a Court-Martial Conviction, ARMY LAW., Dec. 2001, 1, 4–5. 
65. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305:1 (1962). If the offense was committed prior to 
November 1, 1987, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161–66 (repealed 1987) governs good time. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 
2008, at 14 (2008), available at http://ndqq-defender.org/static/resources/BOP%20Legal%20Re 
source%220Guide%202008.pdf. Inmates are eligible for both statutory and extra good time. Id. at 
15. The former can be forfeited either in its entirety or partially “if the prisoner violates institution 
rules or commits any offense.” Id.  
 66. The change in maximum good time per year resulted from the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act (PLRA), which went into effect April 26, 1996. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (2006); see also Families 
Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM), Frequently Asked Questions About Federal Good Time 
Credit (2008), available at http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/Final_Good_Time_FAQs_10.2 
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The Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) Designation and Sentence Computation 
Center is responsible for all good time calculations of federal inmates held 
in BOP facilities; those held in private prisons have their good time 
computed by the individual facilities.67 There should, however, be no 
difference in result.  
One of the most disputed issues pertaining to federal good time is the 
way in which the BOP calculates it.68 Since the BOP deducts good time 
from the days actually served by the prisoner rather than the sentence 
imposed by the judge, the maximum amount of good time per year is 
effectively forty-seven days.69 Courts have deferred to the BOP’s 
calculation of good time as agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute.70
The fifty-four day rule arose from the construction of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines in 1987.71 The guideline ranges are 15% longer than 
the time Congress intended for prisoners to stay incarcerated.72 This meant 
that prisoners should serve only 85% of the sentences imposed.73 The fifty-
four days amount to almost exactly 15%.74
                                                                                                                     
1.08%581%50.pdf [hereinafter FAMM, FAQs]. The PLRA good time rule covers all inmates 
convicted after that date. 42 U.S.C. §1997(e) (2006); FAMM, FAQs, supra; see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT: GOOD CONDUCT TIME UNDER THE 
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT, P 5884.03 (2006), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/prog 
stat/5884_003.pdf. 
 67. See FAMM, FAQs, supra note 66, at 2. 
 68. Stephen R. Sady & Lynn Deffebach, The Sentencing Commission, The Bureau of Prisons, 
and the Need for Full Implementation of Existing Ameliorative Statutes to Address Unwarranted 
and Unauthorized Over-Incarceration 2–9 (2008), available at http://www.rashkind.com/alterna 
tives/dir_04/Sady_Over-Incarceration.pdf. Stephen R. Sady, Misinterpretation of the Federal Good 
Time Statute Costs Prisoners Seven Days Every Year, CHAMPION 12 (Sept./Oct. 2002). Other 
concerns include the calculation of good time credit for concurrent sentences. See Stephen R. Sady 
& Lynn Deffebach, Grid & Bear It, 31 CHAMPION 56 (May 2007). 
 69. See FAMM, FAQs, supra note 66, at 3–6. 
70. See, e.g., Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 800, 809 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that BOP 
violated Administrative Procedure Act by failing to articulate a rational basis for its interpretation of 
good time, but upholding the interpretation as reasonable nonetheless); Bernitt v. Martinez, 432 
F.3d 868, 869 (8th Cir. 2005); Sash v. Zenk, 428 F.3d 132, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2005); Petty v. Stine, 
424 F.3d 509, 510 (6th Cir. 2005); Brown v. McFadden, 416 F.3d 1271, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2005); 
Yi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526, 534 (4th Cir. 2005); O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 
174 (3d Cir. 2005); Perez-Olivo v. Chavez, 394 F.3d 45, 52–53 n.6 (1st Cir. 2005); Pacheco-
Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266, 1270–71 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that BOP’s calculation of 
good time was reasonable). Cf. Moreland v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 431 F.3d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 
2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1106 (2006) (finding statute to be unambiguously referencing “time 
served”). In Moreland, Justice Stevens wrote a concurrence to the denial of the grant of certiorari, 
suggesting that Congress clarify the statute as it had done once before in 1959 when the same issue 
arose and Congress “und[id] a judicial determination that credit should be based on time served 
rather than on the sentence imposed.” Id. at 1907 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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Congress replicated the 85% rule in the 1994 Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act, which created a “Truth in Sentencing” (TIS) 
grant program for states.75 The TIS legislation provides funding to states to 
increase their capacity to house violent offenders if those states either 
require violent offenders to serve at least 85% of the sentence imposed, or 
increase the percentage of violent felons sentenced to prison, increase their 
average time served, increase the percentage of the sentence served by 
incarcerated violent offenders, and have laws in effect that require those 
with one or more prior federal or state convictions of a violent crime or 
serious drug offense to serve at least 85% of the sentence imposed.76 The 
consequence of TIS legislation has been that an offender serves a much 
longer period of time than before.77  
In the federal system, previously proposed legislation would have 
increased good time up to sixty days per year for federal inmates if they 
satisfactorily earned a high school diploma, a GED, or “certification 
through an accredited vocational training program, college, or 
university.”78 Inmates would also have earned the maximum good time if 
they had completed “interventional rehabilitation programs, including 
mental health and drug abuse programs.”79 Sole responsibility for awarding 
the good time would have rested with the BOP.80
The bill was designed in part to increase the BOP’s accountability for 
programming that leads to better re-entry. As some have written, the 
proposed legislation pursued three goals: “to promote public safety by 
offering constructive incentives for exemplary institutional adjustment,” to 
“increas[e] educational standards” and to “decreas[e] the overall cost of 
corrections.”81 Some research, however, indicates that institutional 
adjustment and recidivism are relatively unrelated because prisons are an 
artificial environment.82 Therefore, compliance with prison rules may in 
fact be counterproductive to successful re-entry. When an inmate 
                                                                                                                     
 75. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
§ 20101(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 1816 (1994); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 13701–02 (West 2007). For a detailed 
background on the legislation, see Greene, supra note 38, at 55–62. 
 76. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
§ 20102(a)(2)(D), 108 Stat. 1796, 1816 (1994). For allocation of funding, see 42 U.S.C. § 13708 
(2006). 
 77. PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 1, 14 (1999), available at http://www.ojp.us 
doj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf. 
 78. Literacy, Education, and Rehabilitation Act (LERA), H.R. 4283, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (1st 
Sess. 2007) [hereinafter LERA]. The bill was originally introduced by Congressman Scott in 2005. 
See H.R. 3602, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005). 
79. LERA § 2(a). 
 80. Id.
 81. Posting of Jeralyn Merritt to Talk Left: the Politics of Crime, http://www.talkleft.com 
(Oct. 21, 2003, 05:39 EST). 
 82. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 264–65. 
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participates in a program to gain release, such a decision does not 
necessarily reflect moral growth or rehabilitation. More disturbingly, it 
may be solely indicative of successful functioning in an artificially 
controlled environment, rather than be predictive of success in a less 
structured setting. While all prisons require a certain structure and control, 
rehabilitative programs and especially work programs also need to allow 
for increasing choices to replicate life on the outside more accurately. 
Increased education standards will only be meaningful to inmates upon 
release if the standards lead to (better) employment. For that reason, 
institutional educational opportunities should be constructed carefully. Any 
shorter imprisonment, even with enhanced programming, will be cost-
effective, assuming that more inmates are not returned to prison for 
violations committed during supervised release or for more offenses 
committed over their lifetime.  
Recidivism studies indicate that certain good time programs can both 
enhance public safety and save costs.83 Through the transmission of skills 
and application of such skills, successful programs bring about cognitive 
transformation. However, not all program options are created equal as 
static factors may play a crucial role in an individual’s chances for program 
success. Static factors include the type of crime committed, prior criminal 
history, prior employment history, and a history of substance abuse.84
In 1989, the BOP introduced its first residential drug and alcohol abuse 
treatment program as a pilot.85 Today, the Residential Drug Abuse Program 
(RDAP)86 awards up to one year of sentence reduction for participating 
non-violent offenders.87 The number of inmates who volunteered originally 
                                                                                                                     
83. See, e.g., Schriro, supra note 29, at 179–81. 
84. Id. at 180. 
85. See BERNADETTE PELISSIER ET AL., FEDERAL PRISON RESIDENTIAL DRUG TREATMENT 
REDUCES SUBSTANCE USE AND ABUSE AFTER RELEASE 3–4, available at
http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/recidivism/orepramjalcd.pdf (last 
visited July 14, 2009) (noting that development of residential substance abuse programs occurred 
following a conference held in 1988). Alan Ellis, J. Michael Henderson & James H. Feldman, Jr., 
Reducing Recidivism: The Bureau of Prisons Comprehensive Residential Drug Abuse Program, 
CHAMPION, July 2006, at 36, 36. 
 86. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) (2006). 
87. Id. Those convicted of a “crime of violence,” which the BOP interprets as including the 
possession of a weapon, may participate in RDAP, but are excluded from early release. See THE 
2009 CRIM. JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., SMART ON CRIME: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT 
ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 55 (2008), available at http://www.2009transition.org/criminal 
justice/ (last visited July 20, 2009) [hereinafter SMART ON CRIME]. INS detainees, pre-trial inmates, 
and contractual boarders, which includes prisoners housed by the BOP but sentenced under the 
authority of any state or the United States military, are statutorily precluded from program 
participation. Alan Ellis & J. Michael Henderson, Reducing Recidivism: The Bureau of Prisons 
Comprehensive Residential Drug Abuse Program 1, 3, available at
http://www.alanellis.com/CM/Publications/reducing-recidivism.pdf. 28 C.F.R. Parts 545–550 
(Jan. 14, 2009) (D.C. non-violent Code offenders eligible for RDAP and its sentence 
reduction).The BOP also excludes from participation all those with a detainer. U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT FAQS, available at
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was small, in part because the rigorous program did not provide any 
incentives for participation.88 Even when the BOP began to offer some 
rewards in the form of goods and performance pay awards,89 the number of 
participants remained small.90
The number increased dramatically after passage of the 1994 Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act which provided up to one year 
sentence reduction for non-violent inmates who successfully completed the 
residential drug abuse treatment program.91 Because a large number of 
inmates fulfill the program prerequisites, an ever higher number of inmates 
have been able to benefit from the program.92 At any point in time, about 
six thousand inmates are now enrolled in the RDAP, with an even longer 
waiting list.93 The long waitlist combined with the way in which the BOP 
administers the program, however, has decreased the resulting sentence 
reduction for program participants. As of summer 2008, the average 
sentence reduction amounted to only 7.7 months.94
The positive response to the program results from the RDAP being the 
only program in the federal prison system that allows for early release 
based on program participation. Upon early release, all program 
participants will be transferred to a community correctional center (CCC) 
for up to six months to participate in a transitional pre-release program, 
ideally immediately prior to their release.95
                                                                                                                     
http://www.bop.gov/inmate_programs/substanceabuse_faqs.jsp (last visited July 15, 2009). 
 88. Ellis, Henderson & Feldman, supra note 85, at 36. 
 89. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.57 (2009) (outlining current incentives other than early release). 
 90. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 1997 SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT PROGRAM IN THE FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF PRISONS, REPORT TO CONGRESS, AS REQUIRED BY THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND 
LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994, at 12 (stating that as of 1993, approximately 1,100 inmates had 
participated). 
 91. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) (2006). The legislation also required the BOP to provide such 
treatment for all “eligible” inmates, which the BOP subsequently defined as all those with a 
verifiable and documented drug, alcohol, or prescription abuse problem. Id. § 3621(e)(5)(B). See 
also BOP Program Statement 533.02 (changes in eligibility for some offenders). 
 92. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS ANNUAL REPORT ON 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT PROGRAMS FISCAL YEAR 2007, REPORT TO CONGRESS 11 (2008) 
[hereinafter FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, ANNUAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT PROGRAMS REPORT 
2007] (stating that in fiscal year 2007, almost five thousand inmates received the sentence 
reduction; a total of almost twenty-eight thousand inmates have received the sentence reduction in 
the last dozen years). Pre-sentence data from fiscal years 2002 and 2003 indicate that approximately 
forty percent of federal inmates meet the substance abuse disorder criteria. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE FEASIBILITY OF FEDERAL DRUG COURTS 6 (2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/pdf/drug_court_study.pdf [hereinafter FEASIBILITY OF FEDERAL DRUG 
COURTS REPORT]. 
 93. Ellis, Henderson & Feldman, supra note 85, at 38–39. The Bureau of Prisons, however, 
reported a substantially higher participation number of inmates in 2007, without any indication of 
the existence of a waitlist. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, ANNUAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 
PROGRAMS REPORT 2007, supra note 92, at 11. 
 94. SMART ON CRIME, supra note 87, at 55.  
 95. Ellis, Henderson & Feldman, supra note 85, at 36. 
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The RDAP is based on the assumption that drug and alcohol addiction 
are intimately connected to offending, even if the precise correlation 
remains contested. In any event, it is generally accepted that “drug 
dependence can amplify the offending rates of people whose circumstances 
may already predispose them to crime.”96 Once the addiction has been 
broken, reform and rehabilitation of the offender proceed more smoothly, 
so as to decrease future offending and ultimately enhance public safety.97
The goal is to turn the offender into a productive member of society by 
providing a cognitive transformation. 
C. “Good Time” in the States 
Not unlike the patchwork in our state and federal sentencing regimes 
generally, good time awards continue to vary dramatically between states. 
In some states, good time is tied to the length of time served, with longer 
sentences meriting larger amounts of good time.98 In others, good time may 
be linked to prior record and current offense.99 New Mexico’s good time 
policy, for example, continues to be strikingly different from the federal 
policy. Up until 1999, offenders served on average only about half the time 
imposed, with variations between offenders based on the offense of 
conviction.100 Today’s Earned Meritorious Deductions statutory policy 
assesses the allowable deduction based on solely the offense of conviction. 
For example, serious violent offenders receive only up to four days of 
credit for every thirty days served, which means they will serve at least 
85% of the sentence imposed.101 Most other offenders, excluding parole 
violators, receive up to thirty days for thirty days served.102 Credits may be 
forfeited but may also be restored.103 In addition, offenders may earn a 
“bonus” award for successful completion of select types of 
programming.104
Illinois subscribes to a similar regime. Violent offenders are eligible for 
up to only 4.5 days of good conduct credit for each month of an 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Tim McSweeney et al., Twisting Arms or a Helping Hand? Assessing the Impact of 
“Coerced” and Comparable “Voluntary” Drug Treatment Options, 47 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 470, 
470 (2007). 
 97. While debate continues as to whether coerced drug treatment is as effective as voluntary 
treatment, a substantial number of studies indicate that even coerced treatment results in 
“considerable and sustained reductions in reported substance use, injecting risk and offending 
behaviours.” Id. at 485. 
 98. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 229–30. 
99. Id.
 100. USEEM ET AL., supra note 45, at 6. 
 101. NEW MEXICO SENTENCING COMM’N, TIME SERVED IN NEW MEXICO PRISONS, FY 2008:
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF EARNED MERITORIOUS DEDUCTIONS 2 (Oct. 2008).
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.
 104. Id. 
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imprisonment sentence.105 Most prisoners, however, receive one day of 
good conduct credit for each day of their sentence.106 In addition, 
successful completion of an educational or substance abuse program or 
prison industry work assignment may lead to further reduction of the 
length of a prison sentence.107
New York created an extensive Merit Time Program in 1997. Inmates 
who are serving prison time for non-violent offenses can earn up to a one-
sixth reduction of their sentence. To be eligible, inmates must not have run 
afoul of disciplinary rules and must either have obtained a GED or a 
vocational training certificate, participated in alcohol or drug counseling, 
or performed community service as member of a community work crew.108
Drug offenders are eligible for an additional one-sixth decrease in their 
time if they fulfill two of these requirements or work release.109 The 
program has led to substantial savings in corrections costs in New York 
State.110  
Good time may be credited as a whole at the beginning of a prison 
term—making its revocation a punishment rather than a reward for good 
behavior—or may be credited as it is earned, yearly, quarterly, or 
monthly.111 The award of good time, as well as its revocation, rests largely 
with prison officials, and may vary substantially.112 Under BOP and state 
regulations, inmates who have been sanctioned for violating prison 
disciplinary rules may lose all or part of their good time credits.113 The 
United States Supreme Court has held some minimal due process 
protections to apply to proceedings based on which offenders lose good 
time.114 Such a holding indicates the importance of good time to prisoners 
                                                                                                                     
 105. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(a)(1)–(2) (2008). 
 106. Id.
 107. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3-(a)(4) (2008). 
 108. STATE OF NEW YORK—DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, MERIT TIME PROGRAM 
SUMMARY—OCTOBER 1997–DECEMBER 2006 1 (Aug. 2007). 
 109. Id. at 2. 
110. Id. at ii. For a further update on release data, see STATE OF NEW YORK–DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, MERIT TIME PROGRAM SUMMARY—APRIL 2007–SEPTEMBER 2007 (Apr. 
2008). 
111. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 224–25. 
112. See USEEM ET AL., supra note 45, at 10. 
 113. Some state systems revoke good time also for other reasons: Thirteen states allow for 
forfeiture of good time if inmates file frivolous lawsuits. In Missouri, that forfeiture provision 
explicitly includes situations in which inmates had asked for DNA testing which confirmed their 
guilt. Tonja Jacobi & Gwndolyn Carroll, Acknowledging Guilt: Forcing Self-Identification in Post-
Conviction DNA Testing, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 263, 292 (2008). FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 2008, at 14 (2008). 
114. For a detailed account on the due process analysis in one state, see Jeremy J. Overbey,
Comment: The Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division: Controlling and 
Disciplining Society’s Inmate Population, 4 TEX. TECH J. ADMIN. L. 257 (2003). See Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563–66 (1974) (stating that evolving and flexible due process 
protections require in this context “advance written notice of the claimed violation and a written 
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and their reliance on its existence. Nevertheless, opposition to good time 
continues. Some has come from academics, some from politicians who 
object to the “leniency” created by good time, and some from practitioners.
D.  Rejecting Good Time 
Good time is open to the same criticism as indeterminate sentencing, 
and some sentencing reformers have rejected it for similar reasons.115
Nevertheless, many of the early sentencing reformers in the state systems 
included generous good time provisions in their proposals and reforms.116
Good time injects a certain level of uncertainty into the length of the 
sentence to be served, thereby undermining the initial judicial sentencing 
decision. The uncertainty created “deprives a prisoner of the incentive to 
prepare seriously for release and fosters self-defeating despair.”117  
Typically, back-end discretion is virtually invisible and prison officials 
are substantially less accountable than judges.118 Moreover, earned good 
time poses particular issues if work assignments or program spaces are 
insufficient.119 It may also be problematic if correction rules preclude 
certain offenders from participating in rehabilitative programs even though 
they would be statutorily eligible.120 Revocation of good time appears 
particularly subject to abuse unless it vests at some point or can only be 
revoked in part.121  
Because good time laws serve at least one specific purpose 
(independent of any finding of rehabilitation), Pierce O’Donnell and his 
co-authors suggest replacing good time with a modified early release 
program. Early release would depend on the BOP’s evaluation of the 
inmate’s “institutional conduct and performance,” but would be limited to 
one-tenth of the sentence.122 Should the BOP find the inmate unsuitable for 
early release, it would be required to hold a hearing to provide the inmate 
                                                                                                                     
statement of the fact-finders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary 
action taken”); id. at 566 (stating inmate is also “allowed to call witnesses and present documentary 
evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional 
safety or correctional goals”); id. at 570–71 (stating the inmate is entitled to the right to assistance 
in preparing and presenting a defense at least under some circumstances; the decision-maker must 
be “sufficiently impartial”). In a later case, Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. Walpole v. Hill, 472 
U.S. 445 (1985), the Court required that “there be some evidence to support the findings made in 
the disciplinary hearing.” Id. at 457. 
115. See O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 41, at 56, 68; Jacobs, supra note 33, at 243. 
 116. Greene, supra note 38, at 47–48. 
 117. O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 41, at 68. 
 118. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 218–19. 
119. Id. at 235. 
120. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Terms of Imprisonment: Tracking the Noncitizen Offender 
Equality, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 174 (2009) (critiquing exclusion of offenders with immigration 
detainer from RDAP program). 
 121. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 238–39. 
 122. O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 41, at 70. 
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with an opportunity to present his case for early release once the inmate has 
completed three-fourths of his sentence.123
Such limited good time would allow for the existence of some 
disciplinary mechanism while maintaining the focus on the sentence’s 
retributive character.124 However, no evidence exists that prison officials 
could not use other discretionary programs to reward good conduct or 
penalize violations of prison rules.125 And, in fact, some already do.126
Others argue that good time is inappropriate if viewed as an indicator of 
rehabilitation because compliance with prison rules does not predict 
recidivism.127 Moreover, incentive-based program participation fails to 
indicate moral improvement, or necessarily lead to it. In addition, some 
have criticized the use of good time to encourage participation in 
rehabilitative programs.128
Much of the criticism of good time has been based on the assumption 
that sentences are too long and need to be shortened as part of a sentence 
reform movement. Since the publication of such criticism thirty years ago, 
sentences have lengthened further rather than shortened, and the number of 
people incarcerated has sky-rocketed. The political pressure to increase 
sentence length has been almost relentless, and the number of prisoners as 
well as the amount of time they serve has increased dramatically since 
those pre-reform days. This reality, however, seems to have been only 
insufficiently considered in the current version of the Model Penal Code: 
Sentencing. To be considered a true “model,” designed to revolutionize 
sentencing, it should start from much lower sentence lengths which would 
allow for a theoretically and practically based re-thinking of good time. If it 
is, on the other hand, to some extent grounded in present reality, it should 
also focus on the most recent—albeit limited—work on the success of 
rehabilitative and work programs, so as to inform good time decisions. 
E.  Good Time in the Model Penal Code: Sentencing Drafts 
An early draft of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing indicated generous 
amounts of good time, up to 20% each for good conduct, program 
                                                                                                                     
 123. Id.
 124. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION, DOING JUSTICE: THE 
CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 101–02 (1976) (indicating that 10% to 15% of good time would be 
acceptable). 
 125. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 258–59. 
 126. Rewards other than good time may include furloughs, transfers to lower-security units or 
prison facilities, or monetary awards. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 242. The experience in the early 
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127. Jacobs, supra note 33, at 264. 
 128. NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 18, 49 (1974). 
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participation, and extraordinary service.129 However, such large sentence 
reductions would have dramatically enhanced the discretion of prison 
officials, who are largely unaccountable to the public. A later draft seemed 
to settle on 15% of good time for good conduct, with another 15% being 
awarded for “extraordinary service, such as saving a life or assisting in 
recapturing an escaped inmate.”130  
The latest draft now provides for good time for good conduct at a 
minimum amount of 15%. Since the 15% reduction would be presumed, 
prisoners could lose such good time only if they commit a criminal offense 
or “a serious violation of the rules of the institution,” or if they “failed to 
participate satisfactorily in work, education, or other rehabilitation 
programs.”131 A presumption of a good time reduction may not only be 
easier to administer but may also carry a symbolic effect on the prisoner 
who is presumed to be able to follow rules and regulations, which may 
indicate a societal belief in his rehabilitation. The reason for the relatively 
limited amount of good time now available is again to avoid back-end 
discretion.  
Good time that continues to be provided allows prison authorities to 
exercise some “authority over prison durations as a tool to manage the in-
prison behavior of inmates.”132 However, there is only limited explanation 
for the choice of 15% as the minimum amount of good time states should 
award. While federal law and some states have adopted a 15% rule, the 
commentary notes that “no data exist for derivation of an optimum 
formula.”133 The Model Penal Code: Sentencing in its current form does 
not adopt a vesting rule; however, in the commentary, it provides language 
for one. Currently, good time does not vest in any state. 
IV. FRAMING GOOD TIME IN THE CURRENT SENTENCING 
CONTEXT
The United States prison system has grown dramatically in the last 
twenty years. Today, state and federal authorities hold over two million 
people. The BOP incarcerates over two hundred thousand prisoners134
which makes it the largest jailer in the United States. The federal prison 
system has grown at least three times as fast as state systems within the last 
decade, and costs about five billion dollars a year.135 It has particularly long 
                                                                                                                     
 129. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2007). 
 130. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 2008). 
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 134. SCOTT D. CAMP & GERALD G. GAES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
GROWTH AND QUALITY OF U.S. PRIVATE PRISONS: EVIDENCE FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 2 & n.3 
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sentences for non-violent offenders. For drug offenses committed between 
the early nineties and the following decade, the average time to be served 
has increased by almost one-third, from 32.7 months to 42.9 months.136
Starting in the 1960s, as crime became a salient political issue, 
legislators increasingly clamored for longer sentences and increased 
harshness toward offenders. The tide, however, appears to have turned, 
especially in light of tight state budgets and enhanced emphasis on public 
safety which mandates long prison terms only for those who constitute an 
active threat or are believed to do so—a determination usually based on a 
combination of the offense of conviction and the offender’s prior criminal 
record. Public opinion polls indicate that people support education and job 
training programs for inmates to prepare them for release. According to 
polls, three-quarters of the public also favor early release for prisoners who 
have participated in such programs, largely because they view such 
prisoners as unlikely to recidivate.137 Thus, the public will support 
programs that rehabilitate offenders and therefore enhance public safety, 
and is willing to reward those who participate in such programming. 
All sentencing and corrections regimes exist to protect numerous goals 
and values, which include equal treatment, autonomy, participation, 
transparency, and legitimacy.138 Good time can assist in achieving these 
goals when constructed carefully and when designed to provide a sufficient 
incentive.  
Good time should fall into two categories. One category should be tied 
to satisfactory behavior, with a relatively small amount of good time 
sufficient to incentivize such behavior. While some criticize this 
requirement as minimal,139 prison inmates are convicted for running afoul 
of societal rules. Therefore, they deserve some credit, albeit limited, for 
complying with rules.  
The second category should be tied to whether they have achieved a 
goal that is crucial to their future rehabilitation and social reintegration, 
such as drug treatment, or an educational or vocational achievement.140
This is especially the case if program success indicates a substantial 
cognitive change from earlier thinking. If good time is tied to program 
                                                                                                                     
3, available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/sl_fedprisonpopulation.pdf; U.S.
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140. See id. at 25–26. 
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participation, sufficient seats must be available in such programs, so as not 
to randomly exclude otherwise eligible offenders. Such exclusions would 
necessarily lead to inequities and resulting difficulties in managing an 
institution.  
If opportunities to earn good time are equally available, correctional 
goals will be fulfilled. Autonomy aims at “leaving people alone” but at the 
same time holding them responsible for their decisions. While 
imprisonment has often been charged with infantilizing offenders, the 
ability to earn good time through personal choices and behavior restores 
some autonomy to inmates. It restores the inmates’ opportunity to believe 
in their ability to operate as independent actors. This is especially true if 
the programming decisions become part of the offender’s pre-release plan, 
so that every step on the way toward release either shortens the time to 
release or improves the conditions of the inmate’s confinement. 
Despite the fact that participation rights in sentencing and release 
decisions have begun to include victims and their focus on the offender has 
diminished to some extent, imprisonment should be addressed differently. 
Imprisonment deals solely with the offender and his punishment. During 
that time, offenders should play an active part in their rehabilitation and 
participate in shaping their future. Efforts that resemble those of a law-
abiding person—following rules—should be rewarded; any action beyond 
that—employment and especially efforts at education and treatment—
should merit even greater reward, with the goal of testing the depth of the 
attitudinal change as soon as feasible. 
Transparency of this good time regime could be assured to some extent 
through clear-cut but sufficiently flexible guideline-like rules that 
determine what merits a discount and how much of a discount to award. 
The construction of such a regime should rely less on currently existing 
rules, which do not appear scientifically founded but rather use 
pedagogical literature to assess how time discounts effect rule compliance, 
goal setting, and achievement in other educational settings. Whether 12% 
to 15% is the appropriate discount for good conduct and for program 
success may be more easily answerable in light of the pedagogical 
literature. While different states provide us with distinct models, their 
experiences may be less important as neither selective programming nor 
thoughtful use of good time are likely to have occurred in most states. It 
may be precisely this laboratory of states, however, that may allow us to 
determine discount rates more likely to achieve our societal goals of 
offender rehabilitation and crime prevention. 
Such transparency is also crucial because extensive use of good time 
will be challenged by victims and the public alike. After all, the time 
imposed in court may appear irrelevant if it will subsequently be cut in half 
by prison officials. Such decrease in the time served should be defensible 
on grounds other than merely “good behavior.” The extensive type of 
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programming envisioned here would make it more defensible.  
In light of the long prison sentences many inmates currently serve, good 
time should become irrevocable at a point to avoid the ongoing threat of 
loss of good time credits. Surely prison systems have other, more 
immediate and harsher sanctions available should serious misconduct 
occur. 
Fair procedures in awarding and taking away good time will be crucial 
in establishing the legitimacy of the system to inmates and the public. The 
procedures should be transparent to the extent possible. Extraordinary 
behavior in the form of saving a prison guard or preventing an effort at 
escape or rioting should not be rewarded within this good time regime. 
Because of its rare nature, it might be appropriate to allow for judicial 
action at that point, giving the court an opportunity to re-assess a sentence 
in light of such unique conduct. 
V.  THE FUTURE: A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
The proposed expansion of good time and its re-thinking is justified, at 
least in part, by the current length of prison sentences in the United States. 
The entire good time regime should be reviewed if our sentence lengths 
begin to decrease.141 Until that point, however, good time is crucial for 
prison management and as a symbol of hope and rehabilitative potential in 
an overly harsh penal regime. A discount of up to one-third of the sentence 
judicially imposed may capture these goals appropriately. Good time, after 
all, encompasses the power of the law to ‘“create, alter, distort, or even 
destroy time itself, not simply our experience of it.”’142 My proposal allows 
inmates to regain some control over time, control that usually escapes any 
prisoner. It puts them in charge of their own fate by choosing compliance, 
and especially by preparing themselves for release. With re-entry becoming 
a mantra in recent years, which is crucial for the reintegration of the 
thousands of inmates who will be released annually, good time incentives, 
combined with enhanced prison programming, could help facilitate 
adjustment to life on the outside and help decrease recidivism. Thus, good 
time can become a valuable tool not only for prison administrators in 
keeping control, but also for the inmate and society in achieving our goals 
of cutting prison time, saving costs associated with imprisonment, and 
decreasing the number of future crimes. 
                                                                                                                     
 141. For an analysis of the increase in the time served by federal inmates, see WILLIAM J.
SABOL & JOHN MCGREADY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TIME SERVED IN 
PRISON BY FEDERAL OFFENDERS 1986–97 (1999). 
 142. Rebecca R. French, Time in the Law, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 663, 693 (2001) (citing 
Jonathan D. Kramer). 
